Arab Ambition to be ‘New Europe’ Shattered

Region’s pretensions for relevance dashed by big-power politics

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

MBS plans. Photo from SPA

It wasn't long ago when Saudi Arabia's Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) expressed his ambition to make the Middle East the ‘new Europe’ – not just that the Middle East would develop but that it would be able to influence global politics. Today, this ambition seems thwarted, with local and global pressures compelling Arab states to make critical policy compromises that may prevent them from acting independently enough to become a (new) power center in world politics.

Instead, the Middle East is now positioned at the receiving end of regional and global geopolitics. The first week of April saw Saudi stocks worth US$133 billion vanish due to US tariffs. The Trump administration also expects Riyadh to invest US$1 trillion in the US to ensure ‘good’ bilateral ties. While Donald Trump has refused to visit Saudi Arabia without official assurance of this investment, the Saudi Foreign Minister is visiting the US this week, primarily hoping to strengthen bilateral relations and keep Riyadh relevant to the US.

This is also the primary reason why Saudi Arabia is keen to host Russia-Ukraine talks and help broker a pact. It is meant to allow Riyadh to showcase its significance to the Trump administration.

This imperative has become even more critical for Riyadh now, given the lack of alternatives in the wake of the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza and the threats of renewed tensions between Washington and Tehran. Before Israel initiated its war on Gaza in October 2023, Saudi Arabia was progressing towards normalizing its ties with Iran, with Beijing playing a pivotal role in facilitating rapprochement. While Riyadh currently does not have significant ‘tensions’ with Tehran, its ability to pursue an independent course of action in the region (and beyond) has become severely constrained.

Thanks to Washington's unquestioning support that enabled Israel to dismantle Iran's “axis of resistance” (Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Asad, etc.), Israel has positioned itself as the Middle East super-state, prepared to supplant the dominant role Washington has held for decades in the region. More importantly, the trajectory towards Israel's dominance also involved the failure of Russia to protect the Assad regime and China to employ even diplomatic efforts to influence, let alone change, the outcome.

For most Arab states, therefore, Russia and China lack sufficient strategic credibility; they can’t be relied on to safeguard their security and interests, making it essential for Arab states to keep their options open with Washington (and Jerusalem). It is in this context that we must view the recent – albeit rare – meeting between the foreign ministers of the UAE and Israel in Dubai. Of course, the issue of Palestine was discussed without any tangible progress made towards a ceasefire, either temporary or permanent.

It is also against this context that we must see the Saudi quest for security and protection from the US. In the third week of March, the US State Department approved the sale of precision-guided weapon systems to Saudi Arabia. From the Saudi perspective, this is a positive development insofar as it indicates the Trump administration’s willingness not to follow the Biden administration’s example of imposing a ban on the sale and transfer of weapons to the Kingdom. Considering that, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institution, Saudi Arabia imports more than 80 percent of its arms from the US, it makes sense for Riyadh to toe the US line. Let’s not forget that Riyad also remains interested in signing a defence pact with Washington.

Other Arab states, such as Egypt, that depend on the US for their economic survival, have even less leeway than Saudi Arabia. Between 1978 and 2021, the US provided Egypt with US$50 billion in military aid and US$30 billion in economic aid, according to State Department figures. Therefore, even if Washington’s plan for Gaza is putting US-Egypt relations to any ‘test’ i.e., because Trump wants Egypt to permanently host Palestinians, Cairo has little agency to resist it, nor does it have enough support from the fellow Arab states.

As it stands, US aid, both military and economic, is primarily rent that Washington pays to these states for being stabilizing parties, serving as buffers between Israel, Iran, Hamas, and all proxies while facilitating the movement of US military assets through the region. Thus, losing US aid would not only drastically weaken their economies but also their militaries, security agencies, and ability to maintain the patronages and oppressions needed to stabilize politics. In short, without US aid, they could end up facing internal uprisings and prospects of regime change.

Even though Egypt is currently trying to speak loudly about an alternative plan for Gaza’s reconstruction, questions about its ability to find enough support from within the Arab world remain. For instance, when Trump introduced his resettlement plan, he named Jordan as one of the destinations alongside Egypt. While Jordan, like Egypt, initially rejected the idea, this is no longer the case. It is for this reason that when Jordan's King Abdullah II recently met Trump at the White House, he adopted a placatory tone and promised to take in sick Gazan children, thus indirectly agreeing to Trump’s resettlement plan and allowing Israel to continue with its plan of completely decimating the society in Gaza.

Earlier in February, when the UAE ambassador to the US was asked about Trump’s plan, he ended up endorsing it, albeit indirectly. “The current approach is going to be difficult,” the ambassador said, adding that “we are all in the solution-seeking business” and he (Trump) doesn’t really “see an alternative to what’s being proposed.”

It is for this reason that the so-called ‘Egyptian plan’ – which came out of the Arab summit held in March in Cairo and called for installing a temporary government in Gaza as Hamas’s replacement – has completely failed to make any difference either in Washington or Jerusalem, forcing Egypt to shift its focus to Europe instead. It led to Macron’s visit to Egypt, where he urged Israel to end the Gaza aid blockade without officially endorsing the Egyptian plan for Gaza’s reconstruction.

But considering the current state of US-EU ties, Macron’s presence in Egypt holds little more than symbolic significance, leaving Egypt (and its Arab allies) without any international support to effectively counter the US and Israel. Hence, the latter’s continuing bombing of Gaza.