China Learns a Lesson From the Syrian Debacle
‘Strategic partnership’ produces nothing but grief
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
When push came to shove, the September 2023 “strategic partnership” that Syria’s former ruler Bashar al-Assad signed with Beijing produced nothing to protect his regime, leaving the pact little more than empty rhetoric, forcing China to confront the limits of diplomacy to attain strategic objectives in a region where multiple national, international, regional, sectarian, ethnic, and religious interests overlap, intersect, converge, and diverge to the point of causing wars that refuse to die out easily.
When al-Assad and Xi signed the partnership, China vowed to support Syria “in opposing external interference, opposing unilateral bullying, and safeguarding national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” China, the agreement said, “supports Syria in carrying out national reconstruction, strengthening capacity building for counter-terrorism, promoting a political settlement of the Syrian issue under the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned principle, improving its relations with other Arab countries, and playing a greater role in international and regional affairs.”
For China, it is a big loss given that it vetoed United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for Assad’s removal eight times. What Beijing now understands is that veto power doesn’t necessarily translate into hard power to allow for blocking changes taking place on the ground. There are limits to a
For instance, now that Islamists are in power in Syria and Turkey – which is very well known for its support for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood – it might stir religious and political tensions across the region. Gulf Arab states and Iran see this development with a lot of apprehension. In its wake, if they were to extend support to alternative Islamists – including supporting the anti-Turkey Kurdish groups – new conflicts would emerge and spread in the region to cause massive disruption. This would come as a direct contrast to the future of connectivity that Beijing claims it is trying to build.
Al-Assad’s fall is a direct outcome of the events following the so-called Arab Spring, followed by a US- and NATO-backed regime change mission that coincided with ISIS’s rapid advance. It also got Turkey involved, advancing the US-NATO agenda of regime change and seeing in the crisis an opportunity to decimate Kurdish resistance. This was the chief rationale for Ankara’s support for what is known as the Syrian National Army, or the Free Syria Army, now allied with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group leading that post-Assad Syria.
For years following Russian intervention in Syria, the Free Syria Army and the HTS were confined to the province of Idlib bordering – and protected by – Turkey. No wonder, even the US president-elected Donald Trump has termed the fall of al-Assad as an “unfriendly takeover by Turkey”.
China’s Loss: Lessons Learned
An extended, protracted war in the region would a) drive up the price of oil, and b) impact Beijing’s economic health directly, as it imports more than half of its oil and gas from the Middle East. At a time when the US president-elect is gearing up to intensify the ‘trade war’ on China, a disruption to this supply can lead to very serious consequences.
Second, should Beijing continue to rely on Russian and military support to regimes like al-Assad’s to secure its interests? Beijing didn’t have any significant military involvement in Syria, but Russia and Iran had. That didn’t work obviously because of Russian involvement in Ukraine and Iran’s involvement against Israel.
Beijing’s successes in Syria (BRI and strategic partnership) followed the earlier successes of Iran and Russia against the US/NATO-backed “regime change” mission. Today, however, Beijing stands no different from Russia and Iran in the eyes of Syrians insofar as they see al-Assad as a deposed tyrant legitimized by the combined military and economic power of Russia/Iran and China. A stand-alone position not necessarily tied to Russia and Iran might not have had such consequences.
Events in Syria may not have any significant impact on Chinese interests elsewhere in the Middle East. Still, the fact that Beijing is unable to do anything to prevent the total collapse of a BRI-partner regime questions the political side of its “win-win” narrative insofar as politicians tend to interpret “win” first and foremost in political terms. Given this, for instance, China’s various, long-term investments of almost US$3 billion proved futile for the al-Assad regime in the end.
Beijing can very well choose to sit out the fall of al-Assad and continue to deal with the region from a distance. But this would mean, in the wake of the diminished influence of Iran and Russia, that more and more anti-China elements will continue to gain power. In today’s context, even Turkey is not necessarily pro-China.
What Beijing could do is change its ‘watching from the distance’ policy to proactive engagement in the region. It has traditionally relied on diplomacy. Beijing’s efforts led to a rapprochement between Iran and Saudia, which has withstood the Palestinian and Syrian crises. It needs to intensify that level of engagement where it becomes an active player in the politics of conflict resolution, including if it demands some level of military presence such as joint naval exercises, troop training, sale-purchase of defense equipment and weapon systems, intelligence cooperation, etc.
In the Syrian context of today what it means is that Beijing should openly support its major allies in the region i.e., Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in their demands for a “peaceful transition” via a negotiated political settlement. China needs to build diplomatic pressure, including on Turkey, to pave the way for a transition that doesn’t involve HTS as a de facto occupying group that might attract other Islamists in the region to attack Chinese interests. Arab leaders recently met with the US secretary of state in Aqaba to discuss Syria. But China has yet to show its presence as a political player. Its inability to influence the direction in which developments move today will weaken its ability to influence the direction in which developments move tomorrow.
Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an assistant professor of politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on international affairs to Asia Sentinel.