China Cracks Whip on Northern Myanmar Insurgents
Chinese officials appear uneasy and confused by insurgency’s growing strength
By: David Scott Mathieson
Pressure on Myanmar’s major northern insurgent groups by what appears to be an indecisive China worried about its interests in the country has reached new levels in recent months as major battlefield gains and the takeover of the major city of Lashio have sparked the appearance of a Beijing backlash.
Border clashes apparently are raising concerns over the threat to cross-border trade and possible refugee problems in China, with Chinese officials at times appearing to back the junta in its efforts to quash the insurgency, with other meanderings into various other revolutionary figures and strategies, including the suggestion that China, at the special envoy level at any rate, has an imperfect understanding of the anti-SAC forces south of Shan State.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) of the ethnic Kokang Chinese Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) with the Arakan Army (AA) as well as a constellation of smaller but 3BA trained and equipped Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) resumed Operation 1027 in late-June and by early August had captured the Northern Shan State capitol of Lashio and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) Northeast Command.
It was a stunning military feat. But it produced a rare if not unprecedented rebuke from China. Cross-border electricity, internet and water supplies were cut to the Kokang capital of Laukkai. In recent weeks, the minutes of a meeting between senior Chinese officials and those of the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) suggest deep frustration at the resumption of 1027.
Meeting at Pu’er in Yunnan, the Chinese Special Envoy for Asian Affairs Deng Xijun and several other colleagues met with UWSA vice chairman Zhao Guoan and other Wa foreign affairs officials. It was a long-winded, remote-control admonishment of the MNDAA by China. The first part concerned the Kokang takeover of Lashio, how much the Wa knew beforehand, and why they sent their own ‘peacekeepers’ into the city: “(w)e are just there symbolically” Zhao replies.
The main thrust of the exchange is Chinese displeasure at the operation with an emphasis that the Kokang have gone too far, and fears that their occupation of Lashio could invite a greater State Administration Council (SAC) assault on Northern Shan State. “We cannot allow the Kokang Allied Army to be a black sheep and act recklessly” to avoid “Myanmar falling into turmoil,” and claimed that “China has taken a series of measures to deal with Kokang and we will continue to increase the intensity of punishment depending on the situation.”
Deng at times indicates that China is backing the junta and Min Aung Hlaing and inquires about UWSA support for future elections in Myanmar and whether the Wa would permit the ‘nationwide census’ to operate in Wa areas (the census was conducted during the first two weeks of October). It is highly unlikely the Wa, who have sat out the 2010, 2015, and 2020 elections and the flawed 2014 census, would change their stance, but it was a clear dodge at expressing support for any election.
There are also sections of Deng asking Zhao about impending revolutionary attacks in the coming months in Mandalay, including specific troop numbers, to which Zhao replies, “(no), they just made this up.” There is a threatening tone for the Wa officials to ensure that they do not support the 3BA or any forces of the opposition National Unity Government (NUG).
The Chinese outline how the Wa must help to contain the Kokang, especially in arms and materials and promises that they will curtail the MNDAA from supporting the NUG and PDFs, effectively a blockade. But these borders inside Myanmar are porous and negotiable, and it is clear the Wa have the flexibility of who to choose to support.
Days after the minutes leaked, the MNDAA issued an order prohibiting its officials from travelling to any “ASEAN (Association of Asian Nations) country,” or Western countries, or speak to the media without permission, which was superfluous seeing as the Kokang have shown no interest in any of them in the past. It appeared to be little more than a sop of contrition.
There have been other data points of evident Beijing's ire against the revolutionary groups. The visit by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi on August 14 with SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing, came as speculation swirled that China had clearly thrown its weight behind the military regime. Six FTC-2000G fighter aircraft were delivered soon after, in the midst of a nationwide airstrike spree. But these aircraft have been in the supply chain for many years and are part of a long-standing bilateral defense relationship.
In recent days, rumors of Min Aung Hlaing planning a visit to Beijing have resurfaced, as they have periodically since the 2021 coup. The SAC completing a farcical census in the first two weeks of October and the official rhetoric of a ‘nationwide election’ in 2025 has been accompanied by speculation that China intends to support the SAC’s nebulous transition plan. China needs to be mindful of how its purported support for the SAC has seen a sharp rise in Sinophobic social media invective inside Myanmar.
The battlefield gains of 1027 Phase 2 have had inevitable internecine aftershocks within the resistance forces. Tensions and the occasional dust-up between the MNDAA, TNLA, and Kachin and Shan armed groups haven’t deteriorated into an armed exchange. But monitoring by the Myanmar think-tank Nyan Linn Thit Analytica in early October tracks pro-Myanmar Army Telegram channels attempting to exacerbate intergroup tensions in Muse, Kutkai and Hsipaw Townships. These propaganda efforts have also tried to cast the MNDAA as a Chinese proxy, and the 3BA as marauding foreign hordes.
Was the meeting a serious message of punishment to come, or the theatre of reprimand? China may have cracked the whip on the Wa, and the snap may have registered with the revolutionary forces, especially the Kokang. But has the mobilization of multiple anti-SAC forces moved beyond Beijing’s ability to fully shape, if it ever did, and will ritualized admonishments have little practical value?
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues in Myanmar