Indonesian Jihadis Jemaah Islamiyah Call it Quits

Police are watching carefully

By: Ainur Rohmah

Back in the bad old days

In a major accomplishment for the government not only domestically but regionally, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which for three decades waged an often-murderous crusade to create an Islamic Caliphate in Indonesia, has finally called it quits, with the group's leaders publicly affirming their commitment to the republic and its laws. They've also pledged to ensure that their affiliated schools teach mainstream Islam instead of the militant rhetoric that dominated their Saudi-style Wahabist madrasahs.

Their violent activities, including crossing into the Philippines for foreign military training and a wave of bombings, are likely to stop, according to analyst, although they might still pursue the goal of creating an Islamic state peacefully. Based on a court ruling issued in April 2008, JI was designated a terrorist organization in Indonesia, and should have been disbanded. However, they continued to operate and their ideology lives on.

JI led a violent string of events beginning on Christmas Eve in 2000, when they carried out bombings in several regions across the country. Two years later, on October 12, 2002, JI planned and executed the Bali bombings, which killed 202 people, mostly foreigners. Other terror attacks included the JW Marriott bombing on August 5, 2003, the bombing near the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on September 9, 2004, the Bali II bombings on October 2, 2005, and the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings in Jakarta on July 17, 2009.

The disbandment seems widely accepted within JI although some resistance might emerge in specific regions. Sixteen senior leaders convened in Bogor, West Java, on June 30 and announced the organization's dissolution. The event was attended by approximately 130 JI members from various regions across Indonesia.

A report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), a Jakarta-based research organization, identified three primary factors contributing to JI's decision to disband: First, the influence of JI's internal intellectual faction, who have long advocated for dakwah (religious preaching) and education over jihadist activities. Second, the need to safeguard their assets, particularly schools and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). Third is the success of deradicalization programs implemented by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) targeting JI's leadership.

“It is too early to say what the consequences are, but the men who signed the statement have enough respect and credibility within the organization to ensure widespread acceptance,” said IPAC in its report. “Not everyone will be happy, however, and it is not impossible that splinters will emerge. JI supporters in Poso, Banten/West Java, and Lampung will be important to watch.”

This is the first time that such a large group of senior leaders has come forward publicly to announce a strategic shift. If there is opposition, it may take some time for it to crystallize and find the leaders who can make an alternative organization viable. Disbanding likely means JI will ditch the name "Jemaah Islamiyah" and create a new organization centered on education. With at least 190 schools either run by or connected to JI, this new focus makes sense. Foreign military training will probably be off the table, at least for now. The goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia might be tougher to abandon, but their methods will likely shift towards peaceful means.

According to The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), JI was founded in the late 1980s to early 1990s by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. At that time, Abdullah Sungkar held the position of Amir or leader of JI, while Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was the second in command. During their exile in Malaysia, they sent many JI members to Afghanistan to fight against what was then the Soviet Union. There, the combatants were exposed to Wahhabism and Salafism, which later influenced their political goals and violent tactics. JI is known as a terrorist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

The violence perpetrated by JI began to diminish after Para Wijayanto took over as leader in 2008, a trend that continued until his arrest in 2019. According to terrorism expert Noor Huda Ismail, JI transformed into a more moderate organization under Para's leadership, while still maintaining its commitment to establishing an Islamic state. The group adopted more flexible approaches to proselytizing and fundraising, reportedly collecting funds through the Abdurrahman bin Auf Alms Foundation through donation boxes placed in various regions across Indonesia. The group also engaged in palm oil plantations and fisheries, enabling it to amass funds in the billions of rupiah.

Due to its affiliation with the terrorist organization, JI's assets have been targeted by the authorities. In 2021, the Police's Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror arrested several JI leaders and froze the bank accounts of two JI-affiliated fundraising organizations, BM ABA and Syam Organizer. The funds collected were used to finance the organization's operations and fund the “global jihad” program.

Among the six statements made by Jemaah Islamiyah's leaders during their disbandment announcement, none mentioned the aspiration of establishing an Islamic state. They expressed their willingness to abide by Indonesian law and highlighted two points to ensure pesantren curriculums are free from extremist ideologies. The disbandment announcement has led to reduced surveillance of JI-affiliated schools and pesantren by Detachment 88. According to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), there are 198 pesantren affiliated with this organization, possessing valuable assets in the form of land and buildings.

Analysts believe JI's disbandment is partly a strategy to safeguard their assets. The dissolution statement shields their assets from potential freezes and government seizures. Sidney Jones, Senior Advisor at the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), suggests that abandoning their covert status and operating openly is the only way to protect JI's assets, primarily educational institutions. Jones also points to the influence of JI's intellectuals, who have long favored preaching and education over jihadist actions. The intensive engagement of Detachment 88 Counterterrorism Unit with JI's intellectual circles is also considered a factor in the group's disbandment.

According to expert Noor Huda, suspicion remains that the disbandment is a strategic move to conceal their true goals and pursue a higher purpose. This concept is often referred to as taqiyya, the practice of deception for a pious goal in times of danger or persecution. By pledging allegiance to Indonesian law and orthodox Islam, JI's leaders could gain legitimacy and public support. “We must also consider the possibility that JI's disbandment is a strategic reorganization effort. Scattered fighters and splinter groups could be reconstituted under a different name or integrated into other militant networks to expand their influence,” said Huda, who is also a Visiting Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore.

While former JI leaders have declared the organization's dissolution, experts argue that this doesn't automatically nullify the criminal acts committed by individuals who were part of the banned group. Therefore, law enforcement must still take action against them. The government also needs to remain vigilant against potential rejection from younger JI members regarding the disbandment decision made by senior figures. It's not impossible that new groups could emerge as splinters from JI. In 2000, for instance, a split occurred within JI due to differing views on how to establish an Islamic state. Some JI groups doubted the effectiveness of violence in achieving their goals, while others thought otherwise.