The QUAD – or Most of it – Has Little Wish to Challenge China
Despite Washington’s wish to inject some virility, QUAD’s no NATO
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
Born in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’s struggle for meaningful growth seems never ending despite US aspirations to resuscitate it into a potent counterweight to China in the Asia Pacific. In what was US President Joe Biden’s last summit as host of the club, comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia, he would have hoped for a more frontal and united diplomatic assault. That expectation can’t be naïve given that Biden promised to make the American presence in the Asian region more robust.
Biden himself was quick to remind his guests that “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region, and it’s true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South China, South Asia, and the Taiwan [Strait].” Yet, his guests didn’t agree with him, leaving him disappointed. In the joint statement issued after the late September summit in Biden’s hometown of Wilmington, Delaware, there was not a single direct reference to China, the country itself, or to Beijing, or Xi, or the Communist party. Although the statement expressed its “concern” about the geopolitical situation in the East and South China Seas, the visible absence of any actor responsible for the situation revealed more about internal disunity than anything else.
“QUAD is here to stay,” assured India’s Premier Narendra Modi. But what exactly it will do to counter what has always been seen as the main elephant in the room was neither mentioned nor discussed publicly. Why, despite tensions with Beijing, would India even support Biden’s push against China? First, it has no direct interest or stake in the South and East China Seas. Second, while India has deep concerns about China’s military presence in Ladakh along the disputed 4,057-km Line of Actual Control between the two nations, New Delhi and Beijing have been able to use non-military means of dispute resolution, especially since December 2022 when the last border clashes were reported. Since then, Chinese and Indian Corps commanders have met at least four times, with the fifth likely to take place soon. No fresh clashes have been reported, with both sides increasingly appearing amicable in their statements. This is both a disengagement in military terms and a reset of ties in diplomatic terms. More importantly, this thaw happened without any external mediation or intervention.
Still, India’s resentment of – and opposition to – Washington’s approach to Russia is public knowledge. In fact, contrary to what Washington would have expected a few years ago, India is one of the largest buyers of Russian oil, helping Moscow to defeat the impact of Washington-backed sanctions. But New Delhi can pull this leverage mainly because of its importance for Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategy. New Delhi understands this importance perfectly well. Therefore, it is willing to support the QUAD, although that mainly comes in the form of rhetoric.
There is little denying that Japan and Australia, unlike India, have stronger incentives to integrate with the US vis-à-vis China. But, for them, the QUAD isn’t the only mechanism. Australia, for instance, is part of the AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) treaty that gave it access to nuclear-powered submarines to maintain the maritime balance of power. As opposed to the QUAD lack of financing, AUKUS members are spending billions of US dollars. Japan recently also joined the US and South Korea in a trilateral security pact in addition to Tokyo’s recent decision to massively increase its military strength, although with US help.
The point is that such bilateral and trilateral arrangements have much more visible military face – and are, therefore, more valuable platforms – than the QUAD, which is one key reason why most member states other than the US are not very keen to invest any more than they already have in this alliance. It is for this reason that the last summit particularly emphasized ‘encouraging’ member states to secure funds for the QUAD from within their national budgets. Other intentions include working “with their respective legislatures to deepen interparliamentary exchanges, and encourage other stakeholders to deepen engagement with QUAD counterparts.”
A concrete development includes the establishment of a regional Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI), whose intended purpose is to help member states “monitor and secure their waters, enforce their laws, and deter unlawful behavior.” However, how MAITRI would be funded, where it would be based, and what its structure would look like are key details that are yet to be filled. Its first “workshop” will be held in India in 2025.
Whether it will yield any significant results depends not only on its presumed viability for QUAD states – and not all states have direct maritime disputes with China – but also on what happens in Washington next month. Donald Trump’s victory and return to the presidency could deliver a serious dent in QUAD’s nascent armor. Other weapons rhetorically added to this armor include initiatives in public health, cutting-edge and critical technologies, and quality infrastructure – issues that have nothing to do with China per se.
Even though it was born on paper 17 years ago, the QUAD thus continues to struggle. Although it has been partly institutionalized via regular summits and meetings at the ministerial levels, its ability to become a regional force continues to be stifled by the diverse geopolitical trajectories of member states.
Therefore, if the rationale for Washington’s support for an idea that originated from Japan was to develop QUAD as an instrument to manage and expand its interests in Asia-Pacific, it continues to lack supporting mechanisms and is still far from fully operationalized. As it stands, the only time even the media pays some attention is when a summit takes place. The attention, however, seems to result from the fact that leaders of the four nations met rather than from the expectation of any major developments, leaving serious questions about the future of this alliance as a major player in the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor to Asia Sentinel