Saudi-Iran Ties Stand to Get Stronger

MBS's best way to demonstrate post-Trump election strength is to shake hands with Iran

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

Few elections can be as consequential for global geopolitics as the election of the US president. It is not just a coincidence that the Saudi military chief went to Tehran right after Donald Trump’s victory to meet his Iranian counterpart. The meeting was planned – and took place – in anticipation of Trump’s victory and the geopolitical shifts it will introduce to the regional equation. There is little denying that Trump’s presence in the White House is a major boost to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That is the dominant perception in Riyadh and Tehran, compelling them to build on the path of rapprochement partially paved by Beijing. The idea seems to be working.

Days after the meeting in which the Iranians expressed a desire for the “Saudi navy to join Iranian naval exercises next year, either as participants or observers,” Saudia’s Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) copied predominantly Iranian discourse about Israel committing “collective genocide” in Palestine.

Addressing a gathering of Muslim and Arab leaders, MBS, as the Saudi leader is known, also criticized Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Iran, urging the international community to “compel Israel to respect Iran’s sovereignty and not to attack (Iranian) territories.”

Notwithstanding the good relations that Trump enjoyed with the Saudis when he came into power in 2016 and chose Saudia for his first foreign visit, his re-election does not appear to have left any impact on changing Riyadh’s position. In fact, MBS’ pro-Iran position appears to be a logical outcome of some very recent events, including a statement by former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, an evangelical Christian leader named as Trump’s nominee for Israel Ambassador, announcing his support for West Bank annexation. “Well of course,” Huckabee answered. “I won’t make the policy, I will carry out the policy of the president.”

Not Merely Rhetoric

MBS’ ideas are not merely rhetoric. In the wake of Iran’s attacks on Israel in October, Gulf states led by Riyadh played a key diplomatic role in convincing the US to pressure Israel not to attack Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities. In addition, reports also indicate that the Gulf states closed their air space for Israeli jets to cross to attack Iran. This is a major development insofar as it presents a contrast with the past where Riyadh called Iran’s nuclear program a threat and supported Washington’s sanctions to cripple the Iranian regime. In 2018, MBS was not keen to protect the Iranian nuclear program. Back then, MBS claimed, while comparing the Iranian supreme leader with Hitler with a (sectarian) agenda for the entire Middle East, that Saudi Arabia would develop its own nuclear to deter Iran.

Now, when the Saudi and Iranian defense chiefs met, they discussed the possibilities and ways of extending defense diplomacy and bilateral cooperation. The intention, as it stands, seems not to give the Trump administration an easy access to Riyadh to enlist its support in the former’s geopolitics.

The Abraham Accords

There is also little denying that Riyadh anticipates a major push from the Trump administration to revive the Abraham Accords, bilateral agreements on Arab–Israeli normalization, which have gone moribund in the wake of the events of October 7, 2023. The Biden administration tried unsuccessfully for years to make Riyadh join the pact. Just before Hamas attacked Israel, the US-Saudia deal seemed a real possibility. Ever since then, the Saudis have hardened their position vis-à-vis Washington by forcefully sticking to their demands, which reportedly include Washington’s support for a Saudi nuclear program and a defense pact that would legally bind the US to Saudi security.

In the context of Trump’s victory and his claims that he will bring the Ukraine and Palestine wars to an end, Saudia expects pressure. They understand that Trump’s dominant strategy to end Israel’s war will be through the accords. If the Saudis want to negotiate with Trump, they want to be able to do this from a position of strength, necessary from the Saudi point of view also because Riyadh understands Trump’s aversion to offering military assistance. While Trump might be willing to sell weapons systems, Riyadh has been looking for a formal military treaty. For Riyadh to convince Trump, it needs to do this from a position of considerable strength.

The best way to demonstrate this strength is to shake hands with Iran – a gesture that indicates to the Trump administration that Riyadh doesn’t have an enemy in the region that might require it to seek US protection. Therefore, if Trump pushes to end the war and wants to protect Israel, the Saudis will be able to extract concessions on a scale that the Biden administration appeared unwilling to concede.

Where Iran Gains

For Tehran, it is important to continue to reinforce the path of the 2023 “Beijing Agreement,” the China-brokered agreement that normalized Saudi-Iran ties after years of tensions. Iran cannot afford to fight a multifront war against Riyadh, Israel, and the US. Tehran fully understands the implications of Trump’s election and the collective synergy it brings in Washington and Jerusalem vis-à-vis Iran. By keeping its ties with Riyadh as normal as possible, Tehran is seeking to minimize the possible anti-Iran nature of the Abraham Accords following Saudia’s possible membership.

At this stage, there is little denying that Iran’s interests are best served if Saudia doesn’t join the pact. MBS’ appropriation of Iranian discourse of Israel’s genocidal war also indicates that Riyadh, besides using this position to impress upon Washington the necessity of fulfilling Riyadh’s security needs, might not be willing to participate in the Accords as readily as it would otherwise seem possible, especially if it comes at the expense of its rapprochement with Iran.

Tehran also understands the political context against which Saudis have made the shift towards Iran. For Riyadh, rapprochement with Iran is a gateway to its access to the so-called ‘new’ world order that China and Russia claim to be building. Riyadh’s normalization with Iran followed the push to join BRICS.

Both Saudia and Iran, therefore, gain more from continuing their ties, both in the long and short runs. To the extent that this relationship happened against the geopolitical context of increasing competition between China and the US, this competition is going to become intense with Trump’s victory. In the context of this competition, countries like Saudi and Iran stand to gain insofar as they can extract concessions from big powers – and from each other.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor to Asia Sentinel