Mister Lam’s Visit to China
Vietnam adjusts its position on the South China Sea
The elevation of To Lam as Vietnam’s unchallenged party boss will go down well in Beijing for two reasons. First, it mirrors Xi Jinping’s obsession with “security” interests – in this case national security rather than the party power security in Vietnam. It mirrors the dominance of one individual with a hold on power strengthened by anti-corruption campaigns which enable the removal of rivals. Likewise, rhetoric about economic growth and the role of the private sector is not matched by a reality where fear of falling victim to an anti-corruption campaign limits risk-taking and cooperation between public and private sectors.
Second, Lam’s focus on ideological purity and solidarity between their respective Communist parties requires setting aside the South China Sea issues at a time when China is maintaining constant quasi-military pressure on the Philippines. Lam’s cozying up to Beijing with an August 19 state visit just after his elevation provided both parties with the opportunity to pretend that China’s claims on Vietnam are not as outrageous as those on the Philippines. In previous times, Vietnam put lives on the line to defend its islands and fishing fleets. For now, this is no longer necessary, with China seemingly turning a blind eye to Vietnam’s intensifying land reclamation in the Spratly Islands.
It is a reversal of the days of President Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal when Vietnamese diplomats complained bitterly about the Philippine lack of willingness to challenge China’s incursions, a policy only reversed when Benigno S. Aquino III’s administration took the matter to international arbitration – and won decisively although his successor, Rodrigo S. Duterte, then declined to protest China’s aggressions into Philippine territory. China-Vietnam hostility has deep historical roots. It will not go away. But keeping quiet about it will certainly benefit Beijing, and presumably also Mr Lam for the time being.
China’s divide-and-rule policy also appears to be working with Malaysia, judging by its apparent willingness to see the dispute as a bilateral one and criticized extra-regional involvement in the issue. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim may be known for the variety of views and faces he represents depending on his immediate political interests so this may not be permanent. But there is, at least in some quarters, a sense that because China’s island and sea claims involve waters off Sarawak and Sabah rather than the Malay-majority peninsula, they are less important than otherwise would be the case. Given Malaysia’s military links to the US, it is also hypocritical. “Bilateral dialogue” with China sought by Malaysia is little more than Malay retreat in the face of claims which reach within a few kilometers of its shores.
But not everything is going Beijing’s way. Indonesia’s new leader President Prabowo Subianto has his eyes clearly set on raising his nation’s international profile. Though this will not veer from Indonesia’s longstanding – going back to the Bandung Conference of 1955 – policy of non-alignment and neutrality in big-power rivalry, whether US-Soviet or US-China, its desire for more global influence means Indonesia will be more of a player. Probably there will be more talk about the Global South and a slightly louder voice demanding Israel be brought to account for its Gaza war and West Bank occupation and colonization.
But Indonesia’s own national interests, in the case of the South China Sea, de facto align with states contesting China’s sea claims. Although there is no dispute over islands, China’s claims overlap Indonesia’s archipelagic and Exclusive Economic Zone waters and Chinese fishing vessels protected by coast guards have been plundering them. For Indonesia, this is a major issue. In January 2020, the government scrambled F-16s to chase Chinese fishing vessels out of its Natuna waters. The whole concept of archipelagic waters was proclaimed by Indonesia in 1957 and after years of international debate became enshrined in the UN Law of the Sea.
Non-alignment for Prabowo does not mean keeping aligned countries at arms-length. In mid-August, as defense minister, he was in Australia overseeing the finalization of the elevation of an existing Defense Cooperation Agreement to a formal treaty which will later be signed in Jakarta. In other words, Indonesia did not see Australia’s membership of the AUKUS agreement or other treaty links with the US as a barrier to much closer ties.
Prabowo could also be expected to make more of Indonesia being ASEAN’s largest and most populous nation. Overcoming the treaty organization’s lack of cohesion, notably on the South China Sea, may be a hopeless task. But in raising its profile in the region Indonesia will be helped by a long history of cordial if distant relations with Vietnam and India, and by the increased Indian role in regional trade – including arms.
