Interesting piece. Since the ride and rise of China in economic terms, attention has turned more and more to China's geopolitical or geostrategic ambitions, more in the South China Sea than elsewhere. But even in the case of elsewhere, where Chinese money has flowed either in terms of foreign investment or delt-laden loans, say to as far as Africa or South America, and more and more to countries geographically closer to China, and indeed even China's space ambitions, the inevitable questions that arise are when is the next big war; i.e. Third World War, and will it be between the US (and its allies) and China (and its allies)? And what form will it take -- a conventional war or a technological-nuclear war? Both are valid questions. But the answers one gets are less than convincing that an all-out war will happen on the scale of a third world war. Just as I doubt a nuclear war will break out.
I am reminded of the days when we were students of detente. Detente took three forms: (a) political/diplomatic with ideological battles in the background including proxy wars; (b) posturing but not much else; and (c) the mutually-assured destruction doctrine that has, and continues to prevent a nuclear war. In all of the world's theatres where wars have broken out, especially in the Middle East, where certain states are nuclear armed and others have tried to develop their nuclear capability despite not possessing that capacity unless it is surreptitiously provided by nuclear-armed states like Russia, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and China, a nuclear war isn't, to my mind, a probability. It remains only a possibility on the basis that only certain countries have the capability or the capacity but even here there is no equalization of capability, capacity or the will. That's not to say military strategists do not calculate scenarios every day of not just how to fight a new high-tech war, and one that include chemical-biological weaponry, but also calculating how they might prevent one.
And arms race isn't anything new. Seriously. So what might China's two planes and aircraft carrier suggest in terms of regional/global strategy and war strategy? Just that -- posturing. And a little bit of what is called sabre-rattling. As the article suggests, China is trying to "teach" Taiwan -- a sovereign, independent state -- that China's old threat of re-unification by force if necessary is no laughing matter. And it isn't. But sure even China would be calculating how much destruction from such a disastrous and complete dumb move it is prepared to sacrifice of Chinese lives and property should that war eventuate, and will Chinese people forgive emperor Xi Jinping, who is already on the nose of many civilians, thanks to his outstanding inability to revive China from its four-year structural economic doldrums.
So far as I am concerned, Xi play toys, while real, are simply to show the Taiwanese, the West (particularly the US), the Japanese, the South Koreans and the Southeast Asians that China has come of age in military terms but its belligerence on using force is merely that of a China bully. Even Xi knows that ramming a US naval ship is not the same as ramming a Philippines coastguard vessel let alone a Philippines fishing boat. Even threatening US jetfighters flying in international airspace is by and large "restrained", raising only complaints, if anybody is listening. But the arms race will continue until such time as the US's military industrial complex's capacity to develop new war toys is enhanced, although US government debt and fiscal deficit are hampeing that capacity development. Likewise, at some point, whilst it might develop its own (indigenous) technological knowhow for its military muscle, cannot continue as if the economy is plucking 10% GDP growth of the yesteryears.
The US is in relative decline. No question about this. And China might already be heading that way. It can print all the yuan it wants to develop its military needs but to use it will be costly to China in more ways than one. There is something called "opportunity costs" in the realm of economics that even China cannot escape. All it can do is what it is doing now -- stealing or borrowing technological sophistication for military development and heavy-handed bullyboy posturing, almost as if Xi, bedevilled at home for his one-man dictatorship, is trying to shore up his popularity and political legitimacy at home at a time when Chinese nationalism, as fake as it is, is dwindling while the economy suffers.
Interesting piece. Since the ride and rise of China in economic terms, attention has turned more and more to China's geopolitical or geostrategic ambitions, more in the South China Sea than elsewhere. But even in the case of elsewhere, where Chinese money has flowed either in terms of foreign investment or delt-laden loans, say to as far as Africa or South America, and more and more to countries geographically closer to China, and indeed even China's space ambitions, the inevitable questions that arise are when is the next big war; i.e. Third World War, and will it be between the US (and its allies) and China (and its allies)? And what form will it take -- a conventional war or a technological-nuclear war? Both are valid questions. But the answers one gets are less than convincing that an all-out war will happen on the scale of a third world war. Just as I doubt a nuclear war will break out.
I am reminded of the days when we were students of detente. Detente took three forms: (a) political/diplomatic with ideological battles in the background including proxy wars; (b) posturing but not much else; and (c) the mutually-assured destruction doctrine that has, and continues to prevent a nuclear war. In all of the world's theatres where wars have broken out, especially in the Middle East, where certain states are nuclear armed and others have tried to develop their nuclear capability despite not possessing that capacity unless it is surreptitiously provided by nuclear-armed states like Russia, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and China, a nuclear war isn't, to my mind, a probability. It remains only a possibility on the basis that only certain countries have the capability or the capacity but even here there is no equalization of capability, capacity or the will. That's not to say military strategists do not calculate scenarios every day of not just how to fight a new high-tech war, and one that include chemical-biological weaponry, but also calculating how they might prevent one.
And arms race isn't anything new. Seriously. So what might China's two planes and aircraft carrier suggest in terms of regional/global strategy and war strategy? Just that -- posturing. And a little bit of what is called sabre-rattling. As the article suggests, China is trying to "teach" Taiwan -- a sovereign, independent state -- that China's old threat of re-unification by force if necessary is no laughing matter. And it isn't. But sure even China would be calculating how much destruction from such a disastrous and complete dumb move it is prepared to sacrifice of Chinese lives and property should that war eventuate, and will Chinese people forgive emperor Xi Jinping, who is already on the nose of many civilians, thanks to his outstanding inability to revive China from its four-year structural economic doldrums.
So far as I am concerned, Xi play toys, while real, are simply to show the Taiwanese, the West (particularly the US), the Japanese, the South Koreans and the Southeast Asians that China has come of age in military terms but its belligerence on using force is merely that of a China bully. Even Xi knows that ramming a US naval ship is not the same as ramming a Philippines coastguard vessel let alone a Philippines fishing boat. Even threatening US jetfighters flying in international airspace is by and large "restrained", raising only complaints, if anybody is listening. But the arms race will continue until such time as the US's military industrial complex's capacity to develop new war toys is enhanced, although US government debt and fiscal deficit are hampeing that capacity development. Likewise, at some point, whilst it might develop its own (indigenous) technological knowhow for its military muscle, cannot continue as if the economy is plucking 10% GDP growth of the yesteryears.
The US is in relative decline. No question about this. And China might already be heading that way. It can print all the yuan it wants to develop its military needs but to use it will be costly to China in more ways than one. There is something called "opportunity costs" in the realm of economics that even China cannot escape. All it can do is what it is doing now -- stealing or borrowing technological sophistication for military development and heavy-handed bullyboy posturing, almost as if Xi, bedevilled at home for his one-man dictatorship, is trying to shore up his popularity and political legitimacy at home at a time when Chinese nationalism, as fake as it is, is dwindling while the economy suffers.